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General Aviation Security 
GENERAL A WATION SECURITY: A SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM MODEL 
FOR COLLIGA TE LEARNING 
William B. Rankin, I1 
1 
Abstract 
A well constructed plan-docheck-act (PDCA) tool, in the context of a Safety Management System (SMS), and 
incorporating a structured field survey, can help students prepare for real-world problems, situations and crises in 
general aviation (GA) security by providing an actual professional environment to study. Thus, through the 
examination of an actual GA airport, students are given the opportunity to work issues through the trials, tribulations, 
experiences, and research findings of others. In this paper all the elements of GA airport security plan are analyzed 
at the collegiate level. It is suggested that this PDCA tool be implemented as a SMS model for the study of future 
ahport security c o m e s  used in the collegiate environment. 
Introduction to General Aviation Security 
Providing effective general aviation (GA) security 
is a complex problem because of the size of an airport, the 
diversity among users, and the unpredictable nature of 
terrorism. A comprehensive SMS approach to all elements 
of GA security is a goal to strive for while recognizing the 
complexity of airport security programs. Title 49 Code of 
Federal Regulations will continue to evolve as new 
technologies and capabilities are developed; as will the 
protocols for GA security measures to prevent terrorist acts 
against the United States (Transportation Security 
Administration, 2008) 
According to the FAA (200) the background of SMS stems 
fiom a systematic, proactive, and well-defined safety 
program. A SMS approach: 
. . . allows an organization producing a product or 
service to strike a realistic and efficient balance 
between safety and production. The forecast 
growth in air transportation will require new 
measures and a greater effort h m  all aviation 
producers-including airport operators-in order 
to achieve a continuing improvement in the level 
of aviation safety. The use of SMS at airports can 
contribute to this effort by increasing the 
likelihood that airport operators will detect and 
correct safety problems before those problems 
result in an aircraft accident or incident. (7 1) 
Role of the Transportation Security Administration 
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) 
is required to prescribe rules to protect persons and property 
on aircra& against acts of criminal violence and aircraft 
piracy, and to prescribe rules for weening passengers and 
property for dangerous weapons, explosives, and destructive 
substances. To cany out the provisions of the Aviation 
Transportation and Security Act of 2001 (ATSA), the TSA 
has adopted former FAA rules requiring airport operators, 
air carriers, indirect air carriers, and foreign air carriers to 
cany out various duties for civil aviation security. Title 49, 
Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), incorporates the 
following Transportation Security Regulations (TSRs) that 
concern aviation security: Part 1542 applies to certain 
airport operators; Part 1544 governs certain air carriers; Part 
1546 applies to the operation of foreign air carriers; and Part 
1548 applies to indirect air caniers such as bight 
forwarders, who engage indirectly in air transportation of 
property within the United States and sometimes operate out 
of GA facilities (Quilly, 2005; Transportation Security 
Administration, 2008). 
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TSR Parts 1520,1540,1542 and 1548 
Part 1520 forbids the disclosure of information that 
may compromise or be harmful to the safety and security of 
the traveling public. Additionally, the regulation sets forth 
the rules that allow the federal government to withhold 
information from public disclosure even when requested 
under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), in litigation, 
or in rulemaking. Airport operators and air carriers are 
required to restrict the availability of infomation contained 
in security programs to those with a need-to-know. This 
need-to-know is defined by the Airport Security Program. 
Under this Part, airport management must withhold sensitive 
security information (SSI) fiom unauthorized disclosure. If 
SSI is released to unauthorized persons, the TSA must be 
notified. Tbis permits the TSA to evaluate the risk presented 
by the release of the information, and to take whatever 
actions may be needed to mitigate that risk (Quilty, 2005; 
Transportation Security Administration, 2008). 
New Part 1540 outlines the rules that apply to all 
segments of civil aviation security and includes rules that 
govern individuals and other persons. This regulation 
applies both to individuals who work at the airport and to 
the passengers using airports. Part 1540 also outlines 
definitions and terms used in Parts 1542, 1548 and others. 
For example, the widely used term escort is given a 
definition within this regulation. Another significant 
addition to the regulatory language is the inclusion of 
individual accountability. The TSA believes that "the 
contribution of individuals to the success of the civil 
aviation security program cannot be over-emphasized," and 
for that reason the "agency believes that holding individuals 
accountable for their security violations will serve as a direct 
and effective corrective action and may prove to be a 
positive deterrent7' (Quilty, 2005, p.8). The TSA believes 
that by incorporating a level of individual responsibility in 
tandem with existing airport security programs a higher 
level of aviation security integrity will be ensured (Quilty, 
2005) 
The TSRs contain general requirements for 
promoting civil aviation security. Each airport operator, air 
carrier, foreign air carrier, and indirect air carrier covered by 
these parts is required to have a security program that 
contains information that specifies how they will perfom 
their regulatory and statutory responsibilities. Again, all 
these security programs are available only to those persons 
having a need-to-know (Quilty, 2005; Transportation 
Security Administration, 2008) 
TSR Part 1 542 Airport Security prescribes rules for 
airport operators servicing and facilitating U.S. certificated 
air carriers, foreign air carriers, and both foreign and 
domestic air cargo carriers. The purpose of Part 1542 is to 
prevent any act of unlawful interference with the safety of 
persons and goods in air transportation. To accomplish this 
goal, the TSA has extended its security regulations to 
airports as the first practical line of defense (Quilty, 2005; 
Transportation Security Administration, 2008) 
The TSA's congressionally authorized area of 
jurisdiction and responsibility focuses on protecting persons 
and property in air transportation against acts of criminal 
violence, air piracy, and terrorism. However, to effect 
security of aircI.aft in-flight, the TSA extends security 
measures to the airport operator by requiring airport 
management to regulate the movement of persons and 
vehicles having access to all aircraft while on the ground 
and within the airport boundary. In all respects, the security 
of civil aviation operations begins at an airport's perimeter 
fence and terminal building interface (Quilty, 2005; 
Transportation Security Administration, 2008) 
Part 1548, indirect air carrier security pmgram, 
covers security procedures for cargo that are accepted for 
transport on aircraft. In general, indirect air carriers are 
required to carry out security procedures for handling cargo 
that will be carried on aircraft (QuiIty, 2005; Transportation 
Security Administration, 2008) 
Aviation Security Advisory Committee 
Recognizing the need for tighter GA security at the 
nation's airports to pmtect against terrorist threats, 
vandalism, and other illegal acts on aviation, in April 2003 
the TSA requested the Aviation Security Advisory 
Committee (ASAC) of general aviation professional trade 
associations such as the Aimaft Owners and Pilots 
Association (AOPA), National Business Aircraft 
Association (NBAA), and American Association of Airport 
Executives (AAAE), etc. to establish a working group made 
up of industry stakeholders to develop guidelines for 
security enhancements for GA operations and airports. The 
working group consisted of the trade associations, airport 
operators, and state and federal government representatives. 
Members of the working group engaged in 
extensive meetings to review GA airport security 
recommendations and to develop a list of GA bestpractices. 
As a result, a list of best practices was designed to establish 
non-regulatory standards for GA operations and security. 
The primary purpose was to assist GA operators in the 
prevention of terrorist acts using GA aircraft against the 
United States. (Transportation Security Administration, 
2006) 
On November 17,2003, the ASAC communicated 
their recommendations to TSA. TSA usedthis document as 
a baseline fiom which to draft a document titled Security 
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Guidelines for General Aviation Airports. This document 
was intended to provide GA airport owners, operators, and 
users with the guidelines concepts, technology, and 
enhancements to secure aircraft and facilities, as well as 
mitigate terrorist activities (Transportation Security 
Administration, 2006). 
Based on the list of GA best practices 
recommended by the ASAC, students could use the survey 
instrument below to study GA security at a local airport. 
Students would first need to obtain the permission fiom a 
local airport operator to survey their airport security posture. 
In the case of several universities with aviatibn programs, 
such as the University of Central Missouri, this may include 
a university owned GA airport. 
General Aviation Security Survey 
According to the Transportation Security 
Administration (2006) a number of issues should be 
addressed by the owners/operators ofGA airports. The main 
purpose of this survey is to establish the operational status 
of airport security in relation to the operational 
recommendations of the ASAC. The resulting survey report 
will comprise three parts: 
1. Fact-finding Survey, 
2. Gap Analysis, and 
3. Risk Assessment 
The fact-fmding part displays compliance or non- 
compliance covering the relevant security areas. Fact- 
finding survey results will form the basis for the gap 
analysis and risk assessment against standards and 
recommended ASAC guideline. For purposes of this model, 
the following survey is proposed for student leamers: 
Personnel 
Passengers 
1. Do the Pilots-in-Command of GA 
aircraft ensure that the identity of all 
occupants is verified, that all occupants 
are aboard at the invitation of the pilot, 
and that all baggage and cargo is hown 
to the occupants? 
Pilots 
2.  Do pilots using the airport (excluding 
transient pilots) have government- 
issued photo identification? 
Student Pilots 
3. Do aircraft owners control aircraft 
ignition keys so that the student pilots 
cannot start aircraft until instructors are 
ready for a flight to begin? Or, do 
student pilots have limited access to 
aircraft keys until the student pilots 
have reached an appropriate point in 
their training curriculum? 
4. Do student pilots check-in with a 
specific employee (i-e. dispatcher, 
aircraft scheduler, flight instructor, or 
other "management" official) before 
being allowed access to parked aircraft? 
5. Do student pilots sign or initial a form 
then not receive keys until an instructor 
or other "management official" also 
signs or initials? 
Flight Schools and Aircraj? Renters 
1. Does the schooVrenter require the 
identity of all individuals renting an 
aircraft to be verified by checking a 
govemment-issued photo ID as well as 
the airman certificate and current 
medical certificate (if necessary for that 
operation)? 
2. In addition to any aircraft-specific 
operational and training requirements, 
are first-time rental customers asked to 
familiarize themselves with local 
airport operations, including security 
procedures used at the GA facility? 
3. Do operators renting aircraft look for 
suspicious activities and report these 
activities to appropriate officials? This 
applies to individuals that inquire about 
aircraft rental without possessing the 
necessary knowledge or certifications to 
operate such aircraft. 
Transient Pilots 
1. Are there sign-infsign-out procedures 
for all transient operators identifying 
where their parked is aircraft? 
Aircraft 
Securing Aircraft 
2. Are pilots directed to make it as 
difficult as possible for an unauthorized 
person to gain access to their airplane? 
This would include using existing 
mechanisms such as door locks, keyed 
ignitions, hangaring aircraft or using an 
auxiliary lock to further protect aircraft 
from unauthorized use. Commercially 
available options for auxiliary locks 
include locks for propellers, throttle, 
and prop controls, and tie-downs. Are 
hangar doors locked to prevent 
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unauthorized access or tampering with 
the aircraft is important? 
A irportdFaci1ities 
Airport Vehicle Access 
3. Is vehicle access restricted to facilities 
and ramps? Are there signage, fencing, 
gates andlor other positive control 
techniques in place? This must include 
restricting access to the airside to as 
few locations as possible, balancing the 
need for authorized access with access 
control. I 
4. Where there is access control, is it 
periodically reviewed for access 
authorization -- including codes, cards 
and locks -- to vehicular and pedestrian 
gates leading to airside? 
Lighting 
1. Are outdoor areas lighted to help 
improve the security of (a) aircraft 
parking and hangar areas; (b) fuel 
storage areas, (c) airport access points; 
and other appropriate areas? Are 
proximity sensors used? 
Hangars 
2. Are hangarlpersonnel doors secured 
when unattended? 
Signage 
3. Is appropriate signage posted? 
Wording may include -- but is not 
limited to -- warnings against 
trespassing, unauthorized use of aircraft 
and tampering with aircraft as well as 
reporting of suspicious activity. Does 
signage include phone numbers of the 
nearest responding law enforcement 
agency, 9-1-1, or TSA's 1-866- 
GASECURE, whichever is appropriate? 
Surveillance 
Airport Community Watch Program 
1. Is there an established 
Airport Watch Program 
in effect? 
2. Is there a Aircraft Owners 
and Pilots Association 
Airport Watch Program 
in effect? 
Law Enforcement weer Support 
1. Have procedures been developed by the 
airport operator to have security patrols 
for ramp, aircraft hangars, and parking 
areas? 
2. Has the airport operator communicated 
and educated local law enforcement 
agencies on security procedures at the 
airport? This should include include: 
What does a pilot license look like; who 
is authorized to drive on the ramp; how 
do you get airport access (who has 
key); and what are "normal" 
operations? 
Security Plans and Communications 
Security Plan 
1 .  Is there an emergency locator map at 
the airport? Does it identify gates, 
hydrants, emergency shelters, buildings 
and hazardous materials sites on a grid 
map? Is a copy of this map provided to 
fire and law enforcement agencies? Are 
procedures established for handling 
bomb threats and suspect aircraft? 
Threat Communication System 
2. Has the airport operator developed a 
tiered comprehensive local phone and 
contact list and distribute on a need-to- 
know basis. Include the following 24- 
hour phone numbers on the contact list. 
3. Does the airport operator have radio 
communication capabilities with local 
law enforcement? 
4. Are the TSA and industry best practices 
posted on the airports web site and 
relate information about securing 
aircraft and airport facilities? 
5.  Are security courses available h m  
industry identified on the airport 
operators web site? This should include 
those fiom the American Association of 
Airport Executives, Aircraft Owners 
and Pilots Association, Experimental 
Aircraft Association, and National Air 
Transportation Association. 
6.  Does the airport operator communicate 
all new security policies and procedures 
to airport tenants and the flying public 
when issued by the TSA? 
7. Does the airport operator conduct 
regular meetings with airport tenants 
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and the flying public to discuss the 
security issues and challenges? 
8. Does the airport operator have a 
qualified, single Point-of-Contact 
(POC) for disseminating security 
information? 
Specialty Operations 
Agricultural AircrgF Operations 
1. Does the airport operator direct each 
ownerloperator of agricultural aircraft 
to take appropriate steps to secure the 
a i d  when unattended? Examples of 
existing mechanisms include throttle 
and control locks, propeller locks and 
hidden ignition switches. When storing 
aircraft, does the ahport operator 
recommend that aircraft be stored in 
hangars with steel doors that are locked 
with electronic security systems? When 
-hangers are not available for storage, 
does the airport operator recommend 
that heavy equipment be parked in the 
h n t  and back of agricultural aircraft 
when not in use? (pp. 8- 19) 
Safety Risk Management 
According to the FAA (2007), safety risk 
management (SRM) " ... is a fundamental component of 
SMS. To be truly effective a SMS must have a formal risk 
assessment program that identifies and documents hazards 
on the airport" (p. 9). The FAA (2007) fiuther states that an 
SRM: 
determines associated risk(s) 
identifies the severity and 
probability of the occurring risk(s) 
develops mitigation strategies as 
appropriate 
applies, tracks, and monitors the 
mitigation strategy 
assesses and modifies strategies as 
necessary 
A hazard is a condition, object or 
activity with the potential for 
causing damage, loss, or injury. A 
risk is the chance of loss or injury 
measured in terms of severity and 
probability. (p. 9) 
The PDCA Cycle 
A plan-do-check-act (PDCA) cycle can be used 
effectively to implement the SRM. The PDCA cycle is a 
widely-known and very popular tool; in facf the Airports 
Council International has endorsed this classic tool in its 
education and deployment strategy (see http://www.aci- 
safetynetwork.aerol). The PDCA cycle was developed by 
Dr. Walter Shewharf and made popular by Dr. Edwards 
Deming, considered the father of modem quality control. 
PDCA should be thought of as a continuous cycle, 
repeating as quickly as possible, in upward spirals that 
converge on the ultimate goal. The cycle accounts for 
limitations in knowledge and skills as well as the 
subsequent increase in knowledge as you work your way 
through the process, providing rapid improvement. The 
PDCA cycle is an iterative four-step quality control 
process. The elements include: a) plan, b) do, c) check, 
and d) act. In the context of SMS, the cycle should be 
thought of as a cycle within a system of cycles that makes 
up a security management system (Dartmouth College, 
n.d.). The power of this method is simplicity as it is very 
easy to comprehend as follows: 
1. Plan - Establish the objectives and 
processes necessary to identify and 
deliver the stated security objectives. 
2. Do - Implement the processes to cany 
out the plan. 
3. Check - Monitor and evaluate the 
processes and results against the stated 
objectives and report the outcomes. 
4. Act - Apply actions to the outcomes 
for necessary improvements and/or 
corrections. This means reviewing all 
steps (Plan, Do, Check, Act) and 
modifying the process to improve the 
results before its next implementation 
(see figure 1 below). 
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Figure I. The PDCA Cycle 
Using the survey and the PDCA Cycle to Identi@ the Gap 
Using the airport survey, several site visits and the PDCA 
cycle, learners can perform a risk assessment and a gap 
analysis to identify the gap between the o~timized security 
outcomes recommended by the ASAC and the integration 
of these outcomes by the airport operator at the airport 
studied. This helps provide students with insight into areas 
that have room for improvement. The gap analysis process 
involves determining, documenting and approving the 
variance between recommended ASAC security measures 
and the risk assessment and current capabilities at the 
airport studied (Dartmouth College, n.d.). 
Risk Assessment 
Learners can then use the risk assessment criteria of 
AC 1501552-37 to assess the security risk. The risk 
levels used in the FAA (2007) matrix are defmed as: 
1. High risk - Unacceptable level of risk: The 
security measure should not be 
implemented or the activity continued 
unless hazards are further mitigated so that 
risk is reduced to medium or low level. 
Tracking and management involvement 
are required, and management must 
approve any proposed mitigating controls. 
Catastrophic hazards are caused by: 
a. single-point events or hilures 
b. common-cause events or failures 
c. undetectable latent events in 
combination with single point or 
common cause events are 
considered high risk, even if 
extremely remote 
2. Medium risk - Acceptable level of risk: 
Minimum acceptable safety objective; 
the security measure may be 
implemented or the activity can 
continue, but tracking and management 
are required. 
3. Low risk - Target level of risk: Acceptable 
without restriction or limitation; the identified 
hazards are not required to be actively managed 
but are documented. 
Hazards are ranked according to the severity and the 
likelihood of their risk, which is illustrated by where 
they fall on the risk matrix. Hazards with high risk 
receive higher priority for treatment and mitigation. ( 
P- 11) 
The risk assessments are based on the risk 
assessment in table 1 below. 
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'Table I 
Note. Source: (FAA. 2007) 
Student Recommendations 
Gap snaiysis naturally flows fn)m benchmarking 
and other assessments. Once the general expectations of 
performance in security are understood, it is possible for 
students to compare those expectations with the level of 
prformrmce at which the airport currently functions. The 
cornparisun of the risk assessment lo the level of the 
security measures identified in the survey instnunen1 
forms the gap analysis, which is the basis far learner 
recommcttdations at the conclusion of tire exercise (FAA, 
2007). 
C~nclusian 
(iencral aviatiot~ security is a complex pmblem 
hccausc of thc diversity among aircmfi types, airpor?~, and 
GA operational considcrations as welt as the unprcdictablc 
nature of rerrc)rism. Much wlnerability evivts a1 airprms that 
ean be exploited. This model provides students with a 
comprehensive approach to unkfstanding and using the 
elements of (iA airport security. It alw provides 
inf'nrmatttioil necessary tcl recognize the complexity of good 
GA airport security programs. The TSKs and C;A airport 
wurity will continue to evolve as new technoiogies and 
capabilities are developed. t'mlocois Z'or new security 
processes will be dceelitped and implemented at ( iA 
faciiities. 'thc knowledge s f  same of these pmtacols and 
new CiA airport security p rwews  can be gain4 by use of 
this model it1 colligate learning.+ 
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